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Jurisprudences of Jurisdiction: Matters of Public Authority 
Shaunnagh Dorsett, Shaun McVeigh* 
This essay examines a number of jurisdictional engagements that point to 
difficulties in joining or separating relations between public authority,  
jurisprudences of jurisdiction and the writing of jurisprudence. 
 
Introduction 
Questions of public authority have been intimately connected to those of sovereignty and civil 
authority and the government of territorial states.  It is also the case that the study and dispute of 
forms of authority and public authority that stand alongside, apart from, or beyond, the state has also 
been a part of these debates.  Our interest in this essay lies with drawing attention to some of ways in 
which jurisdictional thinking might be important to thinking about public authority.   
Within ‘western’ legal idioms, questions of multiple forms authority, plural orders and rival 
jurisdictional arrangements are an everyday part of legal orders. This is so as a matter of ‘scope, scale 
and structure’ (Tomlins 2012; see also Sassen 2006). Concerns with plural and rival forms of 
authority arise across a whole range of juridical engagements, from the ordering of personal status and 
relations to the contest and re-alignment of norm generating and law-making activities of international 
institutions and global trade and finance. At present, jurists are engaged in efforts to articulate the 
forms of authority exercised by institutions such as the World Bank, NGOs or international 
corporations, as well as to elaborate an understanding of the relations of trade that might be realised 
through the pluralisation of regulatory forms and the privatisation of commercial norms (Cutler, 2003, 
12-15). For international jurists, such concerns raise questions about how to establish legal formula 
that detach public authority from the civil authority of the sovereign territorial state (Ryngaert 2008).  
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In place of an order of sovereign territorial states, it is argued, it is possible to establish forms and 
formulations of public authority shaped by ‘global constitutional law’, ‘global administrative law’, 
and new forms of ‘administrative governance’ (Teubner 2012). For some, such accounts are best 
understood as developing forms of ‘global legal pluralism’, where overlapping forms of authority co-
exist and clash without a clear determination of an ultimate or superior authority (Berman 2012, 
Twining 2009). 
An understanding of the plurality of forms of authority and of legal ordering is also important and 
interesting to a number of other scholarly disciplines. For legal philosophers, socio-legal scholars and 
anthropologists, relations between public authority and the plurality of legal orders raise questions of 
description, status and conceptual ordering. The work of Brian Tamanaha, for example, has done 
much to show how attempts to do justice to the formation and interaction of legal orders requires an 
account not so much of legal pluralism, but of a pluralism that is capable of addressing a variety of 
normative orders (Tamanaha, 2007). Without this, he has argued, it is difficult to capture either the 
complexity of normative engagement or the reasons why comparative lawyers, anthropologists, global 
studies scholars all find ‘legal pluralism’ a phenomena worth studying.  
For world historians, such as Lauren Benton, Richard Ross, Phillip Stern and Paul Halliday, the 
histories of Empire from the early modern to the modern period are best understood through forms of 
‘legal pluralism’ (Benton and Ross, 2013). As a matter of political control and administration, they 
point out, the empires of European states and of the Ottoman empire engaged in both internal ordering 
of Empire and the study of rival and competing forms of authority. The same could be said with the 
military, political and juridical engagements with other empires and nations. In Legal Pluralism and 
Empires: 1500 - 1800, the authors variously address and practice as historians what Benton and Ross 
call a ‘jurisdictional legal pluralism’ (p.3). From the viewpoint of world history the fact of legal 
pluralism (the plurality of legal ordering) is best understood in terms of ‘the formation of historically 
occurring patterns of jurisdictional complexity and conflict’. Attend to this, they argue, and it is 
possible to make visible the histories of ‘legal conflict in Empires to the study of circulating ideas 
about legal pluralism’ (p.4). 
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While the engagements in this essay touch closely both on the social and legal concerns of legal 
pluralism and of the relations between the writing of history and jurisprudence, our interest is slightly 
different to those of international jurists, legal pluralists or world historians. Rather, we examine how 
authority is shaped and expressed through jurisdictional technique. We argue that what might be 
gained in holding a jurisprudence to forms of jurisdictional practices is a sense of how such practices 
authorise lawful relations and provide a way of exercising authority. We do not offer a legitimation of 
the exercise of public authority, or a justification of the forms of public authority. Rather, we are 
interested in the ways in which the ‘authority’ of public authority takes on juridical form. We are also 
interested in how jurisdictional thinking provides a way of considering and locating the sorts of 
commitments a jurisprudent holds in articulating public authority.    
In this essay we look at three engagements of public authority which have been exercised at some 
remove from projects of joining public authority to civil (sovereign territorial state) authority. All 
three point to the expression of public authority through the techniques of jurisdictional practice. Our 
choice of examples addresses a range of concerns that have been taken up within the office (and 
traditions) of the common law jurisprudent. Thus, here we focus on forms of association and accounts 
of lawful relationship as much as civil authority and sovereignty. The first engagement relates to the 
work of medieval jurists, and their characterisation of authority, which we understand or address in 
terms of (public) authority without sovereignty. The second is judicial - the corporate form and 
dominion of the East India Company. This can be understood as thinking about public authority and 
public consequence when that authority is held apart from sovereignty. The third is jurisprudential and 
addresses accounts of lawful relations found amongst the English pluralists in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century. The first two examples consider forms of authority that separate jurisdiction 
and sovereignty. The third example points to the difficulty that we now have in thinking about the 
‘public’ of public authority without turning that concern, or joining that concern, to one of 
sovereignty. In a concluding comment, we briefly consider the prudence that is practiced through 




1. Jurisdiction and Authority 
A focal point of much of the modern understanding of public authority within jurisprudence 
is the concern with the forms of prestige, supremacy and subordination expressed in law and 
government. In this first engagement with authority we point to a number of ways in which 
jurisprudential formulations of public authority have been shaped by different and often rival 
accounts of jurisdictional arrangement and practice. Here we engage with a number of 
contemporary accounts of medieval jurists that link authority, jurisdiction and status or 
‘public personality’.  
For the historian Franceso Maiolo, the medieval formulations of authority show that there is 
both a specific history of the terminology of sovereignty and great variety in the formulations 
of jurisdictional arrangements. For Maiolo, the repertoires of jurisdiction developed by the 
medieval jurists covered a broad range of interlinked concerns. The widest concern of 
jurisdictio relates to establishing the authority of a supreme power charged with the 
obligation of securing justice and equity. Jurisdiction relates both to the authority and power 
to judge or act on a matter. The term ‘jurisdictional’ could qualify the activity of the 
jurisprudent (discussing the rules of civil life), the juris doctor (elaborating and explaining the 
content of rules) as well as that of the judge (the authority to decide) and the legislator 
(exercising the authority to create new law) (Maiolo 2010, 141-142). In short, Maiolo treats 
jurisdiction as providing the juridical form of the understanding and exercise of authority.  
The theological and political understanding of authority was most often shaped around the 
relations between ordo ordinans and ordo ordinatus or, in modern idioms, constituent and 
constituted authority. For political philosophers and public lawyers the elaboration of 
versions of this relation continues to shape distinctions between auctoritas and potestas 
(authority and power) and, in more complex ways, between imperium and dominium (Berman 
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1983, 114-115).1 In this context, questions of authority and authorisation draw attention to the 
legal personality of who speaks and who hears or listens. What is of interest to us here are the 
ways in which jurisdictio is treated as a mode of imperium or of dominium.  
Jurists, for the most part, come to be remembered by their projects. The medieval juridical 
projects which receive most attention today related to the great elaboration, defence and 
criticism of the dual forms of authority in Europe -  that of the spiritual authority of the Pope 
and the temporal authority of the Holy Roman Emperor. The Roman lawyer and post-
glossator Bartolus of Sassoferrato (Saxoferrato) (1314-1357) is today remembered for his 
reformulation of the relationship between the universal jurisdiction of the Holy Roman 
Emperor (as having (de jure) dominium over the world) and the jurisdiction of Princes (who 
had particular jurisdictions over territories) (Figgis 1905, 151). As jurist, he developed a 
procedural formulation of jurisdictio that took as its central concern the relation to potestas 
and imperium (Woolf, 1913). Bartolus set the question of jurisdiction in terms of the 
prerogatives of the persona publica (public personality) that relate to the conduct of office. It 
is this that shapes Bartolus’ understanding of the superiority of the Emperor as the one who 
bears or carries all jurisdictions. In turn such formulations open up Bartolus’ thought to what 
is now political theory: the characterisation of the right of each city to make its own laws as 
part of the law of nations and the jurisdictional arrangement of the juridical relationship 
between Pope and Emperor under the authority of God (Pennington 1984).  
By contrast, for Maiolo, in the work of Marsilius of Padua (1275-1342) jurisdiction was not 
addressed directly through divine order, but was instead shaped in terms of human authority 
and the institutional ordering of deliberation. For Marsilius, the problem of order was shaped 
around the relation between the auctoritas of the divine constituent order (ordo ordinans) and 
                                                
1  Berman 1983, 114-115. A more public law inflected account can be found in the histories developed in 
the work of McIlwain 1940 and more recently Loughlin (2010). These authors emphasise the division 
between gubernatio and jurisdictio.  
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the worldly constituted order (ordo ordinatus). For Marsilius, legal science did not mediate 
divine and human spheres. The ordo ordinans was natural and considered a part of natural 
reason. The constituted political order was not simply related, if at all, to the divine order. Its 
jurisdictional arrangements and forms of government were plural in almost all aspects: the 
Empire and the City had their origins in customary consent (Maiolo 2010, 207-209, 288). The 
important practical and conceptual distinctions of authority were shaped between potestas 
and violentia (right and might) rather than between auctoritas, jurisdictio and potestas. This, 
for many, has been viewed as a distinctly modern formulation of sovereign authority. 
However, as Maiolo has pointed out, this formulation reflects a particular concern with 
authority rather than with a general concept of sovereignty (Maiolo 2010, 151-152, 285). 
Like the jurist Azo, Marsilius argued that while the Emperor had the maximum power in the 
sense that the Emperor had the greatest power, it was the people who had the fullest power 
(potestas) because it was they who carried natural reason exercised in securing civil peace. In 
this way, writing as philosopher, rather than jurist, Marsilius reformulated the understanding 
of the plenitude or fullness of the jurisdiction of the Pope (ibid., 287). In our gloss here we 
have noted the way in which jurisdictio brings with it an account of authority and public 
personality, although not necessarily one shaped by distinctions of public and private 
authority. Jurisdictio provides the office of the jurist with a device for the technical means of 
ordering legitimacy and for ways of considering disparate accounts of legality.  
A second jurisdictional theme, one that is also taken up by contemporary jurisprudence and 
historiography, is that of dual or rival spiritual and temporal sources and forms of authority. 
Recently, Anne Orford has presented Bartolus’ account of jurisdiction as resonating with 
contemporary attempts to shape the practice of the United Nations Security Council and 
related institutions in terms of the jurisdictional arrangement of public authority (Orford 
2011, 159-160). Orford argues that paying attention to the rival accounts of medieval 
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jurisdiction allows for a formulation of both the political and juridical concerns at issue in the 
development of the jurisdiction of international institutions. The development of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine in the early 2000s established the responsibility of the 
‘international community’ and its institutions to protect populations, particularly in the 
context of the committing of acts of genocide, of war crimes, of ethnic cleansing and of 
crimes against humanity (Ibid., 2). The responsibility to protect doctrine establishes a 
particular mode of expression of authority in the name of universal responsibility of 
protection, care or security and a particular technical means of elaboration.2   
The early formulations of the authority of the United Nations were shaped around forms of 
dual arrangement that held the question of the legitimacy and rights of the state at the level of 
international law. The development of the institutions of the United Nations as an 
‘international executive’ and of the doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’, Orford has argued, 
shadows the contest of jurisdiction shaped by the attempt to create an international 
conscience that would give form to the values of a ‘secular church’ (Ibid., 172-174). A rival 
jurisdictional account would see the ‘responsibility’ to protect as being more a matter of 
securing civil peace and establishing the criteria of a civil authority.  In contest is whether this 
civil authority should be in the United Nations or its security council. The difference between 
medieval thinking about the Holy Roman Empire and the United Nations, and between the 
rule of Princes and the account of executive rule developed by the first Secretary-General and 
then through the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, is that, for the latter, authority is 
caste in terms of function and purpose rather than status and office (Ibid., 148-150). 3  
                                                
2  For accounts that frame the ‘right to protect’ doctrine in terms of  administration and government rather than 
jurisdiction see Anghie (2004) Mazower (2012). 
3  Peter Goodrich’s consideration of the office of the jurist places emphasis on relating jurisdiction to other 
legal devices or modes of establishing the conduct of lawful relations. Goodrich, for example, argues that 
jurisdictional forms are best engaged by addressing the visible and licit forms of representing relations of 
authority (Goodrich, 2014). For Goodrich, Bartolus’ work as a jurist should not be addressed solely 
through an emphasis on the forms of political authority made available to Empire and City, but  should 
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In drawing apart the concerns of jurisdiction, public authority and state sovereignty, we note 
both the plurality of the forms of jurisdictional arrangement and practice and the juristic 
concern with a plurality of jurisdictional forms and devices of authority. To render public 
authority in terms of a jurisprudence we have also made a generalisation about the forms of 
inheritance of jurisdictional practice. Our gloss on Maiolo and Orford draws contemporary 
thought of public authority back to the technical forms of authority, status and jurisprudence. 
Thus, our first take on the jurisdictional form of public authority is to treat public authority as 
a status and as something like an assemblage of jurisdictional devices and practices. 
2. East India Company: Corporations, Authorities and Thinking with Public 
Consequence 
Within the common law traditions, it is the mode and manner of the authorisation of lawful 
relations that offers the clearest account of the forms of public authority. The relationship 
between the sovereign, the body politic and public authority can be treated in a number of 
ways. In the early modern period it is the corporation and the office that are the legal forms 
that represent public authority and through which government is conducted. Phillip J Stern, 
for example, has characterised both English and colonial government in terms of the plurality 
of forms of corporate association (Stern 2013, 21-48). The East India Company is one such 
corporate arrangement through which trade and government were conducted.  Here we follow 
the relation between public authority, sovereignty and the jurisprudence of public law by 
paying attention to jurisdictional practices found within the common law tradition. In doing 
so, we examine some of the difficulties of holding public authority and the particular juridical 
status of the sovereign apart or, indeed, in close relation. The East India Company provides 
one possible account of public authority within a common law idiom. We ask what it might 
                                                                                                                                                  
be approached through his Treatise on Arms and Signs (Bartolus, 1538 discussed Goodrich, 2014, 50, 
63). It is through emblems and signs, argues Goodrich, that the ordering of public life -  its offices, 
duties, rights, privileges  - is given form. In medieval terms, emblems provide the mark of office. In a 
modern, less institutional idiom, they stage or bring to life the norms or rules of action. The task of the 
ordering of appearances and of bringing law to life is part of the honour of the jurist (Ibid., 213-214). 
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mean as a matter of jurisdiction for a juridical order to separate the work of public authority 
from the supposition of the sovereign territorial state. Rather than considering the authority of 
the East India Company as simply established through delegated prerogative (East India 
Company v Sandys 1 Vern. 127; 23 ER 362 (1682)), a point to which we return later, we 
describe its authority as established through the projects of jurists (and judges as jurists), who 
address a range of charters and treaties, express authority through jurisdictional 
arrangements, and measure the material effects which have ‘public consequence’.4  
The East India Company’s first charter gave exclusive right to trade in a defined area.5 This 
was an extraordinarily large trading zone, including ‘East Indies, in the countries and parts of 
Asia and Africa, and into an from all the Islands … of Asia, Africa and America … beyond 
the Cape of Bona Esperanza to the Streights of Magellan’ so long as this did not include areas 
in the actual possession of other Christian Princes. The East India Company was by no means 
the only company with such rights to trade. By the end of the seventeenth century there were 
over 30 such trading corporations. Similar charters in the seventeenth century included that of 
the well-known Levant Company (1581) and Hudson’s Bay company (1670).6 Some charters, 
of which the Hudson Bay Company was an example, also granted proprietary interests ‘in 
free and common socage’.7 This was meant to give the right to hold and govern foreign lands.  
Such grants were more commonly associated with settlement and plantations than with 
trading companies. No such grant was made to the East India Company. Rather, they were 
granted exclusive rights to trade: ‘the entire and only Trade and Traffick, and the whole entire 
                                                
4  For recent works considering Sandys (albeit through a different lens) see Stern (2011), Poole (2013). For 
a brief discussion of the East India Company, ‘public’ and the State see McLean (2004). 
5  For all charters referred to in this essay see Shaw (1887).  
6  For the Charter of the Levant Company see Cecil T Carr (ed), (1913, 30). For the Charter of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company see Hudson’s Bay Company (1931).  
7  The HBC charter of 1670 purported to grant all the territory draining into Hudson’s Bay in free and 
common socage to the governor and company and to make them the ‘absolute Lordes and Proprietors of 




and only Liberty, Use and Privilege of trading and trafficking … to and from the said East-
Indies’. It was further provided that the East Indies ‘shall not be visited, frequented or 
haunted, by any of the Subjects of us, our Heirs or Successors’ unless they were granted 
permission in writing by the company. 
While the Charter granted the company the power to make ‘reasonable Laws, Constitutions, 
Orders and Ordinances’ its jurisdiction was in fact not particularly extensive. In keeping with 
its purpose as a trading entity its legislative and judicial powers were limited and indistinct, 
both exercised by the executive of the company. The 1600 Charter authorised the Company 
to make such laws for its own good government and the better advancement and continuance 
of its trade. Laws made only applied to company servants and punishments were limited to 
fines, forfeitures and imprisonments.  
Under the 1661 Charter much more extensive powers were granted. The charter extended 
jurisdiction with respect to all those who lived in the company factories (settlements) and 
gave the ‘power to judge all Persons, belonging to the said Governor and Company, or that 
shall live under them, in all Causes, whether civil or criminal, according to the laws of this 
Kingdom’. Even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, after the Company is considered 
the have established a territorial presence, this remained a complicated system of mixed 
modes of jurisdiction based in subjecthood and residency (status).8  
The 1661 Charter was extended to Madras, the earliest Presidency, in 1665. In turn, each of 
the Presidencies developed its own judicial arrangements, operating under auspices of the 
1661 Charter. In Madras some regularised tribunals began to operate in 1678, only a couple 
of years before EIC v Sandys (Jain 2009, 15). The extent to which the company asserted its 
own authority can be seen by its issuing in 1687 of a charter to establish the Madras 
corporation and the establishment of a Mayor’s court modelled on the one operating as part 
                                                
8  For one of many examples see Nagaph Chitty v Rachummah and Kenehpah 1 Strange 132 (1802). 
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of the London corporation. This was authorised under powers of making laws (1600 charter) 
and of governing settlements (1683 Charter), thereby ensuring it was subject to Company 
control (Jain 2009, 17). Within the Presidencies, therefore, to the extent that there was a 
functioning legal system, jurisdiction depended on status - subject and resident. Later, as the 
company moved out from the Presidencies, a complex array of local courts were established. 
In the areas adjacent to the Presidency towns – known as the mofussil – the East India 
company courts  – the adalats – operated. These operated under a supposed delegation of 
power from the Moghuls and administered the personal laws of the Hindus and Muslims and 
‘justice, equity and good conscience’ (Jain 2009, 252-253). English law was not binding on 
non-subjects. Beyond these land bases, the Charters of 1683/1686 authorised the company to 
establish Admiralty courts in order to seize the ships of ‘interlopers’ within their areas of 
exclusive trade (Bruce 1810, 496).9 These courts did not last that long – they were largely 
defunct by the late eighteenth century – however they did constitute a significant form of 
jurisdictional arrangement that shaped the juridical authority of much of the company’s 
exclusive trading zone (Stern 2011, 60). 
This short description of the East India Company has emphasised the ways in which in the 
seventeenth century its authority and lawful relations were organised around the jurisdictional 
arrangements of charters and local practices. Courts were constituted under locally made 
company by-laws. It was not until 1726 that a new charter established uniform courts for the 
Presidencies that derived their authority from the Crown rather than the company. In the 
seventeenth century the jurisdictional arrangements of the East India Company were not 
straightforwardly territorial: that is, organised around an exclusive authority over land and 
                                                
9  This arrangement was a response to the increase in litigation caused by ‘interlopers’ (those who traded 
without a licence from the East India Company), such as in East India Company v Sandys. 
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population. Nor was jurisdiction bound to property (dominium).10 While the company came to 
be seen as having territorial (spatial) form in the eighteenth century, at this period its 
jurisdictional arrangements still largely relied on the main form of jurisdictional attachment 
of the early modern period – status (here subjecthood and residency).11 It is tempting to 
characterise the Company as having territorial authority - after all they asserted jurisdiction 
over non-subjects within the areas of the Presidency. However, to the extent that this was 
territorial, it was not territoriality in the sense of the modern territorial state.12  
Regardless of whether the East India Company was, or could be, regarded as ‘sovereign’ in 
the seventeenth century, there was little attempt to argue in this period that it had territorial 
form (based on land). Rather, its authority (whatever the character) relied on the delegated 
prerogative. Or, as described above, its authority (whatever its character) can be described as 
relying upon and created by a plethora of local jurisdictional arrangements which attached its 
jurisdiction to status rather than just territory.  In 1684 the ability of the East India company 
to exclude ‘interlopers’ was brought before the Court of King’s Bench in East India 
Company v Sandys. The Company had sought an injunction to restrain Sandys from trading 
in the East Indies, claiming such activity to be an infringement of their exclusive right of 
trade. Sandys in turn argued that he had a right to trade freely, and that in any case the 
Company’s patents were void because they granted an unlawful monopoly. At heart, 
therefore, this was an argument about the nature and scope of the King’s prerogative, and as 
such the case was argued several times before a panel of judges in the King’s Bench. Counsel 
for Sandys based their argument on the traditional freedom of the seas, and the inability of 
                                                
10  In East India Company v Sandys there were arguments (largely accepted by the court) that the company’s 
possessions were in the nature of a franchise. However, this argument went not to the character of the 
company’s authority in the East Indies, but to the question of whether some kind of proprietary interest 
could be found on which the company could found an action: see arguments of Holt for the company (at 
382) and the judgment of Jeffries CJ (at 553-4). 
11  This is generally dated to the mid eighteenth century: see Buchan (1994).  
12  Jain reminds us that there was no concept of territorial law in India at the time as such - all criminal law 




the Crown to grant a monopoly. Holt, for the Crown, relied on the authority of the Crown to 
prohibit trade with infidels (Coke’s ‘perpetual enemies’).13 More generally, only the King 
could regulate trade - because it was based on treaties made with foreign princes. So the King 
exercised the prerogative to regulate trade in order to defend the nation from evil. He could 
regulate that which might be injurious to public detriment - in other words those matters 
which have public consequence.14 The company’s powers were derived from the King. Thus, 
the characterisation of the Company’s authority in this case (to the extent this is characterised 
at all) is one of delegation of Crown prerogative.15  
If we change registers for a moment, and return to a modern jurisprudential idiom, what is 
being authorised is a mode of government, but what is more important is that it is a 
jurisdictionally arranged mode of authority. By paying attention to forms of jurisdictional 
practice we can see that the incidents of government are ordered through a range of statuses, 
rather than primarily through territory. The case does not turn on sovereignty, but on the 
sovereign’s jurisdiction. In our account we have followed common law forms in order to 
show the ways in which  jurisdictional thinking has a significant role in establishing 
arguments of authority.  
Read in terms of a jurisprudence of jurisdiction and the conduct of lawful relations, we have 
argued that EIC v Sandys is concerned with forms of common law argument. At one level, for 
the jurist this formulation draws out, or makes visible, that the contest of forms of 
commercial and political arrangement in the Sandys case is shaped through jurisdictional 
practice. This is an argument for paying attention to the ways in which authority is authorised 
                                                
13  Calvin’s Case (The ‘post-Nati’) 17  Co Rep. 1a. (1608). 
14  East India Company v Sandys, Holt for the Crown, 375-380 : “... when the doing of an act may be to the 
public detriment, the King hath power to restrain it, and it cannot be done without the King’s licence. ... 
A man cannot enclose a park without licence of the King; in that case he takes nothing of anybody, but 
such inclosing and turning profitable ground into a place of pleasure, may be of public consequence...”. 
15  Two years after Sandy’s a similar result was reached in The Company of Merchant Adventurers v. Rebow 
3 Mod. 126; 87 Eng. Rep. 81 (K.B.) (1687). 
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and exercised – here with public consequence. At another level, as we will discuss in the final 
section of the essay, the linking of public authority through the jurisdictional arrangement of 
public consequence is taken up again in the modern address of international institutions.  
There contemporary jurisprudence shapes such relationships by establishing public authority 
through a variety of ‘technical means’ that in turn create matters of public consequence.  
3. Plural Forms of Authority   
In our third example we turn attention to some of the difficulties of detaching the practices of 
jurisdiction from those of sovereignty and territory in the early twentieth century. To do this 
we turn to the ‘English pluralists’, especially Frederick Maitland (1850-1906) and John 
Neville Figgis (1866-1918), and more briefly, Harold Laski (1893-1950), in order to follow 
some of the ways in which they tried to configure forms of political and legal association 
apart from the (British) sovereign territorial state - or at least apart from the sovereign 
territorial state as conceived by Hobbes and Austin (Hirst, 2005; Runciman 1997). What was 
at issue for the ‘English pluralists’ was the quality of lawful relations and the maintenance of 
a ‘living law’.  
In recent work Janet McLean has pointed to what might be taken as a thematic dispute that 
orders the understanding of the British (English) state within the idioms of the common law 
tradition (McLean, 2012). The concern with the need for a distinct (corporate) personality of 
the state is contrasted with the view that the officials and institutions of government are 
governed more or less by private law (Dicey) (Ibid., ch 1). These concerns are elaborated 
along with a closely related polemic concerning the dangers of either a centralised or a 
dispersed (plural) authority of law and government. At the end of the nineteenth century these 
concerns might have been cast in terms of contrasting views of John Austin, who viewed the 
state and sovereign will in terms of non-transcendent facts of authority and power, and the 
British Idealists, such as T. H. Green, who framed the state and sovereignty in terms of moral 
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personality (Austin 1832; Green 1941; Nicholson 1990). The work of the English pluralists 
addressed the conducts of life made available through contemporary theories and practices of 
political association. They investigated a range of corporate forms and associations that 
existed independently from the sovereign territorial state. Taking up Gierke’s accounts of 
genossenschaft and genossenschaftsrecht (of the forms of fellowship and laws of 
relationship), the English pluralists attempted to give form to, and acknowledge the life of, 
forms of association such as religious bodies, guilds, professional and neighbourhood 
associations and trade unions (Maitland 1900). 
For contemporary political and legal theorists the political ambition of the pluralists to 
sidestep the doctrine of absolute state sovereignty has been a place for the engagement of 
public authority in the international domain. Contemporary debates between ‘global legal 
pluralists’, ‘global administrative lawyers’ and public international lawyers, suggest that the 
concerns of the English pluralists have not yet been exhausted (Bevir 2012).16   
Thematically, our first interest here, however, is not whether pluralists such as Maitland and 
Figgis find juridical and political forms that escape the centralised authority of the sovereign 
territory state, but the difficulty they have in formulating their efforts to do so (see Figgis 
1913; Laski 1917; Laski 1919). To make this point we follow (and re-direct) Carl Schmitt’s 
attack on the inability of the legal pluralists to articulate and respond to the political realities 
of sovereign (State) power, as well as their unwillingness to engage with the conducts of life 
made available through the presence sovereign authority (Schmitt, 2000). Following on from 
this, our second theme in this section is the emergence of the contemporary ordering of public 
authority and sovereignty under the rubric of ‘function’ and ‘organisation’. We follow the 
consequences of how questions of authority are formulated as they move from the juridical 
                                                
16 Although this is not directly  the subject of this essay, making the ‘english pluralists’ a central part of the 
genealogy of legal pluralism rather than treating pluralism as a ‘social fact’ establishes a  different range of 
topics and jurisprudences through which to engage plurality (Twining 2009,  Bevir 2012).   
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forms of jurisdiction and the authorisation of lawful relations to (juridical) forms of function 
and the description of social (and political) tasks.  
The separation of the language of public authority and of the authority of the state has invited 
a number of forms of investigation. For Gierke and the English pluralists the focal point of 
engagement with public authority lay with the quality of forms of collective association and 
with the juridical understanding of corporate personality. For Gierke (and Maitland), the 
question of establishing forms of public authority independent of the state rested on finding 
forms of association (real forms) that are capable of existing independently of the tacit or 
delegated authority of the state. For Maitland, as historian, this concern was shaped by the 
ways in which jurists have understood the variety of forms (corporations and trusts) that gave 
shape to associations and lawful relations. What Maitland addressed was the variety of forms 
of English, and common law, fellowship: the Post Office; trade unions; parishes; municipal 
corporations; and so forth. All these, argued Maitland, had a corporate existence independent 
of the Crown (Maitland 2003). For Figgis, it was the Church that provided the model of non-
state forms of group life and juridical form (Figgis 1913). For Cole it was the form of the 
guild association (Cole 1920). Here, we track the ways in which attending to the language of 
jurisdiction (or its absence) make the plural forms of public authority visible (or invisible). 
By associating East India Company and English pluralists we are drawing again on the link 
between the status of the legal actor (sovereign, corporate) and the practice of jurisdiction.17   
Maitland’s work is significant because it engages both in disputing of the juridical form of 
the state and in developing historical understanding of centrality jurisdiction and procedure 
within the common law tradition (McLean 2012, 71). What is striking is the difficulty that 
Maitland has in joining these engagements. Maitland wrote the history of the common law in 
                                                
17  The connections between corporate form, trust, and the example of the East India Company are briefly 
discussed by Maitland in his essay ‘Trust and Corporation’ in Runciman and Ryan (2003). See also the  
discussion by Stern (2013). 
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terms of its practices of procedure and jurisdiction. In doing so he emphasised the practicality 
and specificity of both the form and knowledge of law (Maitland 1909). The moral and 
political concern with ‘real’ associations was given corporate but not jurisdictional form.18 In 
order to sharpen the sense of the difficulty of separating public authority and jurisdiction we 
turn to the work of John Neville Figgis, the English pluralist who most sharply contested the 
authority of the state. His book Churches in the Modern State (1913) developed Gierke's 
theory of association and the corporate personality of the state by casting late medieval and 
early modern relations of Church and State in terms of authority and jurisdiction. The 
Churches were, for Figgis, the last forms of association that existed independently of the state 
(Figgis 1907). Figgis joined Gierke and Maitland in framing questions of politics in terms of 
association, but his account of the ‘ordered life of the community as a whole’ returns to the 
work of Johannes Althusius and Althusius’ account of the state as made of (and by and for) 
associations (Figgis 1912, 210; Runciman 1997, 131). For Figgis, Althusius and Gierke 
establish the priority of life over the dead letter of the law - and so the quality of lawful 
relations. It is through the arrangements of jurisdiction and authority that Figgis elaborated 
his account of organic or ‘real’ (or natural) corporations and forms of association. Where it 
was possible in the medieval and early modern periods to understand relations of church and 
state in terms of two jurisdictions, and to treat state and church as related through plural 
authorities, this is not something that could easily be argued in England or Scotland at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. There is another sense in which Maitland and Figgis 
might be joined, and that is in their dissent from the way in which the Church of England was 
established (Levy 2012). 
                                                
18  For example, in his essay ‘Moral Personality and Legal Personality’, Maitland, somewhat speculatively, 
links the first systematic accounts of the use of the collectivity of the ‘publick’ to the agency of the 
carrying of the public debt: Runciman (2003, 62-74). See also our comments on Annelise Riles’ 
discussion of ‘collateral’ later in this essay.  
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The centrepiece of Figgis’ Churches in the Modern State is his discussion of the Free Church 
Case.19 While Churches in the Modern State presents a series of linked elaborations of the 
‘nature of human life in society’, and the possibilities of the state as a communitas 
communitatum, the Free Church Case provided a kind of jurisdictional limit point to his 
argument (Figgis, 1913, ix). In 1900 the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church 
(UPC) were united. The UPC did not adhere to the Establishment Principle, a central tenet of 
the Free Church. The case was brought by a minority of the ‘Wee Frees’ (those who did not 
accept the Union, some 27 out of 500). They claimed that the decision in regards to the 
holding of the property of the Free Church held by a Trust Deed was ultra vires. They argued 
that the Church had no power to change its doctrines and therefore the property was no longer 
being used on behalf of the Church as originally intended. 
For the majority of the House of Lords the question was a simple one. It was a reasonably 
straightforward matter of trusts law that turned on the interpretation of the trust deed: ‘the 
original purposes of the trust must be the guide’.20 For them (and we take the Earl of 
Halsbury as representative), what was at issue therefore was not the authority and jurisdiction 
of the Church, but rather the meaning of the Establishment principle (in particular) as a guide 
to the original meaning of that deed. Halsbury acknowledged that the Church arrogated to 
themselves the ‘competence’ to determine their own own creed etc, but subordinated that 
authority and competence to a reading of the deed. For Figgis this formulation showed the 
way in which legal form denied the life of religious associations.            
By contrast, Lord Macnaughten’s judgment includes a jurisdictional account of the 
arrangements of Church and state law. What is at issue for him was not the strict reading of 
the trust deed: this was not, as for the majority, just a question of interpretation. Rather he 
                                                
19  General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v Lord Overton & Ors (1904) AC 515 (the ‘Free Church 
Case’). 
20  See for example the judgment of Lord Halsbury, Free Church Case, 617. 
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acknowledged the foundation of the Free Church proceeded on the basis of the ‘exclusive 
authority of Christ in his own house’ and its position ‘that in all matters touching the 
doctrine, government and disciple of the Church, her judicatories possess an exclusive 
jurisdiction, founded on the Word of God’.21 Macnaughten neither saw the church as entirely 
disconnected with the State, nor outside the authority of the state, nor beyond the ultimate 
jurisdiction of his court. However, for Macnaughten, to fail to acknowledge the inherent 
ability of the Church to determine matters within its own jurisdiction was to fail to see the 
Church as a living organism (636).22 He maintained a jurisdictional competence for the 
Church and accepted its jurisdictional arrangements. 
For Figgis, the Free Church Case should have been understood both politically and juridically 
as part persecution and part failure to acknowledge that the Church exists (Figgis 1913, 36).  
He pointed to what he saw as the oppressive absurdity of the state passing judgment on the 
theological meaning of the covenants of the Church. For Figgis lawful relations embodied, or 
should embody, real relations. The Free Church Case, he argued, denied the possibility of the 
church developing as an organic body by stipulating that the life of the church be viewed only 
in terms of documentary interpretation (Ibid., 33, 40; Geary (2005)). He joined this specific 
concern with his more general one that associations should have an organic existence 
independent of the ways in which the State recognises or purports to grant their existence 
(Ibid., 46). In contrast to the imperial power of the state, Figgis offered an account of 
(English) liberty of association expressed as part of a spiritual being (Ibid., 51). 
Coker, amongst others, has pointed out the ways in which Figgis’ argument seems to repeat 
accounts of sovereignty and the primacy of the form of the State (Coker 1921). We would 
emphasise the way in which Figgis, like Gierke, criticised the ‘absolute’ state and struggled 
                                                
21  Free Church Case, 632, 640, quoting from the arguments of Counsel and from Church documents. 
22  Free Church Case, 636. 
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to characterise political and juridical authority (royal prerogative, ultramontanism etc). By 
emphasising the jurisdictional quality of the argument, we can see that the majority in the 
Free Church Case proceeded on the basis of a single account of the sources of authority. 
Lord McNaughten’s judgment, which does not rely on the prospects of establishing a ‘living’ 
association, notes the plurality of sources of authority, the practice of (religious) association, 
and plurality of jurisdictional arrangements. What is problematic for Figgis is the way in  
which jurisdictional thinking is associated with forms of absolute sovereignty, rather than 
with the rival arrangements of jurisdiction of living or real associations (here of the Church).  
Figgis did not argue that the church is a separate law or a rival jurisdiction. Instead he wanted 
to point to the authoritarian executive rule of both Church and State. In doing so he lost the 
plurality of jurisdictional thinking – although he did maintain the shape of his criticism of the 
relation of Church and State (Strears 2012, 50-52). 
Our interest here lies with what happens when you change emphasis from the unity or 
otherwise of the corporate personality and the plurality of forms of association and turn 
attention to the forms of association and authority made available by jurisdictional practices. 
Maitland’s account of the common law forms of action drew attention to the particular 
technical means through which lawful relations are formed. In turning to the plurality of 
corporate forms, Maitland was interested in the forms of association. Runciman, for example, 
finds Maitland’s reluctance to address ontology of corporate association and its forms of 
lawful life a matter of disciplinary reticence (legal historians do not like to write about being 
(ontology) Runciman 1997). We think Maitland’s reluctance to extend his account of the 
authorisation of lawful relations might be better interpreted as a desire to hold forms of 
association to the technical means of their representation through jurisdictional practices. 
Where Maitland and Figgis posed the question of association and public authority in terms of 
an escape or departure from absolute state authority, later English pluralists such Harold 
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Laski and Cole addressed public authority by redefining state authority in terms of function. 
In his Studies in the Problem Of Sovereignty, Laski also addressed the Free Church Case. 
Like Figgis he was concerned with political facts. In so doing, he placed emphasis on the 
contest of the authority of the state to ‘intervene’ in church affairs. Laski also drew a link 
between the challenge to the state as an idea and acts of resistance to secular power – a 
concern that is framed around nineteenth century accounts of church and state more so than 
Figgis’ invocation of medieval thought. Laski, like Figgis, assumed a community that is 
capable of advancement and coherent ordering (Laski 1916). However his community is 
individualistic and self created.   
In establishing their accounts of association Figgis and Laski, like Cole, turned their analysis 
from group personality to function in order to characterise the conditions of a pluralistic 
political society (Loughlin 2005). Figgis, did not did not seek to abolish public authority or 
power but tasked it with the ‘function’ of making laws for the flourishing of associations 
(Figgis, 1913). In Authority in the Modern State, Laski characterised public authority in terms 
of function and purpose (coordination of lawful relations and associations) (Laski 1919). In 
so doing attention is turned from legal form and procedure to that of state administration and 
government. The sense of the importance of administration and social function is emphasised 
most strongly in the work of Cole and Laski. Laski’s formulation of ‘administrative’ areas 
responds to the view that the state should be seen as one association amongst many. 
Questions of ordering, legitimacy and loyalty should be understood accordingly (Laski, 
1925). The ‘functional’ for writers like Cole ran against representative models of both politics 
and law. It did so because the universal character of individuals prevents their will and 
purpose being limited (Hirst, 1997, 31). What interested Cole then was how associations were 
brought into being and maintained their associations and relations (Cole 1920, Ch 3). In 
Figgis and Laski’s response to the Free Church case, questions of status and effect lost their 
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juridical form because they were detached (though not entirely separated) from jurisdictional 
thinking. As a consequence public authority came to be measured through the social 
understanding of the life of civil association rather than through the juridical understanding of 
the conduct of lawful life (expressed as lawful relations). 
Contemporary jurisprudential understanding and criticism of ‘function’, and particularly 
‘function’ as understood by the English pluralists, has been heavily inflected by Carl 
Schmitt’s assessment of English pluralism in ‘Ethic of State and the Pluralist State’ (1929) 
(Schmitt, 2000). Schmitt’s analysis focuses on both the pluralists’ unwillingness to address 
the facts of (State) power and their unwillingness to live with political forms of 
representation. Schmitt rejects liberal individualism (or liberty) and pluralism because they 
refuse the substantive order and ordering of the State in favour of an ‘agnostic’ state or 
‘clearing office’ (Laski 1919). While Schmitt notes the way in which the pluralists have 
addressed what appears to be the empirical situation of the state - it is held in place by many 
associations - his point of criticism lies with the failure of the pluralists to consider the means 
of political unity in the face of inevitable conflict. Schmitt defended the substantive unity of 
the state. Where public authority for pluralists has been shaped around the cultivation of the 
forms of discrete association, for Schmitt the plurality of conflicts of existence is held in 
place by the unity of the state. 
Much of the effectiveness of Schmitt’s argument turns on his sense that the unity of the state 
is a matter both of authority (auctoritas) and power (potestas). Schmitt also ties this concern 
to that of the representation of authority, or rather to the need of the sovereign to present 
authority (Kelly 2004). While the pluralists drew attention to the institutions of the state and 
the conditions of the formation of associations, they did so by turning relations of law into 
social relations. What the pluralists are left with, argues Schmitt, is a species of private 
authority (Kelly, 2004, 129).    
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Holding on to jurisdiction has allowed us to emphasise two elements of public authority. The 
first says something that is obvious in the context of ‘English pluralism’: many of the 
concerns of authority are better expressed in terms of the meeting of jurisdictions or rival 
jurisdictions than in terms of a movement ‘beyond’ law or the state. (The Free Church Case 
also offers a warning, from within common law jurisprudence, of the many ways in which it 
is possible to judge without sensitivity to jurisdictional concerns.) The second element is the 
quality of the ‘life’ or ‘spirit’ of law. At the risk of over-generalisation, the English pluralists 
were content to leave the law of the state as administration of forms of association (and its 
law as ‘life-less’). Where Schmitt pointed to the ways in which functionalism misses the 
point of political unity and reduces the importance of agonistic politics, we have noted the 
ways in which the English pluralists rendered opaque what is carried and disputed by way of 
jurisdictional form.  
4. Concluding Comments:  Technical Means of Public Authority  
This essay has followed two themes. First, it has examined three gestures of jurisdiction as 
examples of the technical means of establishing public authority. Second, it has investigated 
the reception and use of these gestures in contemporary jurisprudences of authority beyond or 
apart from the state. The presumption of this essay has been that there is something to be 
gained from treating such engagements as conducted through rival jurisprudences of 
jurisdiction. We have concentrated on offering a number accounts of the ways in which 
jurisdictional arrangements carry concerns of authority and public authority. In doing so we 
have offered a positive argument for continuing to address questions of public authority 
through the practices of jurisdiction.    
One of the advantages of addressing questions of public authority through the practices of 
jurisdiction is that it allows for questions of jurisprudence to addressed (historically) in terms 
of institutional conduct. In this concluding section we look to the techniques of jurisdictional 
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arrangement, and the ways in which authority is exercised, by briefly following the 
jurisdictional forms of non-state public authority into the international domain.  
In taking up the work of Paul Hirst in the last section, we noted how he traced the ways in 
which the pluralists linked their concern with political authority to technical means. Hirst 
shaped his understanding of globalism by addressing material, technical and institutional 
forms through which geo-political, juridical and economic activities are conducted (Hirst 
2005).  If we translate Hirst’s concerns with the practical realisation of authority into the 
genres of jurisprudence and the practices of jurisdiction a number of observations can be 
made about the kinds of jurisdictional practice that might carry forms of public authority or 
public consequence.   
From within the University and the disciplines associated with public law, accounts of public 
authority in the international domain are shaped around the concerns of executive rule, 
constitution, administration and adjudication (Ryngaert 2008, 5-10). The concern with 
jurisdictional arrangements divides more or less between the sorts of discussion associated 
with the allocation of disputes for adjudication and a set of concerns about overall 
organisation of relations of authority in the international domain (Teubner 2012, Berman 
2012).  However, by way of a final comment, we pull back from the public law thinking of 
international law and note a prudential side to jurisdictional thinking which emphases the 
creation of relationships of public authority.  
The prudence of jurisdictional thinking is illustrated here through Annelise Riles’ 
ethnographic and jurisprudential  analysis of the regulation of global financial markets (Riles 
2011). In Collateral Knowledge, Riles examines forms of engagement with the management 
of the markets and the practices of regulation. Her work links ‘knowledge practices’ to the 
ways in which ‘legal technique’  has been deployed to create the financial derivatives market 
(Riles 2011, 9-11). Riles’ work is interesting for the way in which it frames authority through 
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the authorisation of relations rather than through an institutional arrangement of the public 
institutions of the international order. The ordering of financial markets can be viewed as a 
matter of private regulation, but the ordering of financial markets clearly is also a matter of 
‘public consequence’, both in the sense that it has had disastrous consequence for the public 
and the sense in which it has involved public institutions creating regulations and acting as 
regulators (however defined). Riles is concerned with a range of institutions and office 
holders that carry out regulatory practices in what might be considered either as the global 
public sphere or a global private sphere. What interests us here are the ways in which the 
concerns of governance and administration and those of constitutional thinking are both kept 
at some distance apart. For Riles, the way in which the regulation of financial services is 
conducted is most cogently understood in terms of technique and technocratic means. Such 
techniques are shared both by the public and private officials in their varied attempts to 
understand and act in the working of the global financial markets (Riles 2011, 240-242).23  
 As a matter of office and role Riles notes that similar juridical and accounting techniques are 
required of regulators and technocrats in a variety of situations (Riles 2011, 223-225). In 
turning these observations to techniques of jurisdiction, Riles might be seen as offering a 
prudential account of the value of regulation and the technical means of creating forms of 
authority. In this account public and private authority alike are viewed as technique and as 
part of an ethos of office. For Riles, like Maitland but not Figges and Laski, to frame legal 
knowledge and authority in terms of technique is part of an attempt to make more knowable 
the technical forms by which the international finance and our lives are created and ordered.  
                                                
23   Netting law allows parties to save or complete their obligations in the event of bankruptcy even when 
these obligations might be void in a formal legal sense.  These laws were part of a suite of legislation 
passed in the 1990s designed to provide security of interests in the derivative markets. See, for example, 
Unidroit Study LXXVIII C - Principles and rules on the netting of financial instruments: 




This returns us to the projects of jurists and jurisprudents to join and separate what is public 
and lawful about jurisdictional practices. 
We close this essay by making a discrete observation about a jurisprudence that takes its cue 
from jurisdictional practice. Without offering our argument as a systematic thesis, we have 
tied our accounts of public authority to forms of jurisdictional and prudential thinking about 
lawful relations. We have presented our account of jurisdictional practice by joining it to the 
commentaries of jurists and jurisprudents. In so doing the concerns of jurisdiction have been 
treated as something apart from efforts to produce either a public law jurisprudence or 
explanations of public authority that are directed to the work of theorising, explaining or 
securing legitimacy. Holding back from direct engagements with those concerns has enabled 
us to present an essay on jurisdiction as a concern of the conduct of authority through 
technical means. It also opens a space for considering again some of the commitments of the 
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